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Current Cominform Propaganda Line

5. The principle field of Cominform propaganda activity in Yugoslavia is first among Communists, and only secondarily among the population at large. The campaign is channeled into two separate directions, one for the Communists and the other for the wide masses of the population. The Communists are told that the true place of Yugoslav patriots lies within the "Camp of Peace and Democracy" headed by the Soviet Union, and that a campaign should be conducted against all exponents of the regime, in the Army, in factories, in mines, and in enterprises, towns and villages through the medium of sabotage and resistance to para-military training and military measures and arming. The ranks of supporters should be so strengthened that at a crucial moment the ruling power of the country can be seized, and Yugoslavia will again return to the "Powerful Camp of Peace and True Democracy". The propaganda line directed to the people denies that the Soviet Union and the neighboring countries of popular democracy are preparing for aggressive action against the "brotherly Yugoslav people", and that they are only opposed to the terrorist and fascist clique of Tito and Rankovic, which the Yugoslav people, led by true Yugoslav patriots will soon overthrow.

Methods of Cominform Propaganda

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6. The main tool of Cominform propaganda is neither the press nor leaflets, but rather a skillfully organized and intense radio propaganda in Serbo-Croatian Slovenian and the Macedonian languages. This type of propaganda is conducted by all of the Informburo government radio stations as well as by series of covert radio stations operated by Yugoslav Cominformists abroad. [redacted] these radio stations cover a total of 37 programs on week days and 40 programs on Sundays. The daily broadcasts, according to the book, cover a sum total of 15 hours, while the Sunday broadcasts cover a total of 17 hours. In the last six months of 1950 the USSR and Satellite radio stations gave a total of 4 months and 8 days of transmissions beamed to Yugoslavia.
7. Although drastic measures on the part of the UDB render the dissemination of subversive newspapers and leaflets very difficult, such reading material can allegedly be found everywhere where there are Communists, and particularly in industrial enterprises.

State of Morale in the Yugoslav Army

8. The main military decision and policy making body, whether these decisions are of an organizational or operational character, whether they refer to training, materiel, or other matters, is not the Ministry of National Defense or the General Staff Headquarters, but rather the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Through its trustees who are placed in the Ministry of National Defense, the General Staff Headquarters, in the military district commands and in the various corps and divisions, and through its numerous political leaders, the Central Committee is constantly alert in order to ensure that Party decisions and regulations are implemented in full.
9. While attempting to estimate the state of morale which exists in the present Yugoslav Army, it is necessary to consider separately, on the one hand the commanding and political cadre, and on the other hand the men and soldiers. Also, it is necessary to make a separate study of the status of morale in the active peacetime Army as opposed to the status of morale in an assumed mobilized Army in the state of war.

a. State of Morale in the Yugoslav peacetime Army.

- 1) [redacted] the Communist ratio among Yugoslav active officers and non-commissioned officers is as follows:

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OfficersNon-commissioned Officers

Members of the Communist Party	81.7%	Members of the Communist Party	70.4%
Candidates of Party membership	1.3%	Skolska Omladina Jugoslavije (SKOJ)	24.3%
Skolska Omladina Jugoslavije (SKOJ)	1.2%	Not organized	5.3%
Not organized	7.7%		

- 2) Since the convening of the Fifth Congress, three new classes of active officers and non-commissioned officers have been created, all of them being compulsory members of the Communist Party. This fact has notably swelled the above figures to the advantage of the Communists and to the disadvantage of the so called non-organized individuals.

State of Morale among the Officers

- 3) The commanding cadre in the Yugoslav Army comprises pre-war Communists, supporters of the Comintern (later Cominform), and Communists who joined the Party during the war. The lower ranking commanding officers comprising Communists who joined the Party during the war and in the post war period are all alleged to be, with the exception of the three recently established classes, trained in the spirit of absolute internationalism.³ The majority of the officers' cadre, both high and low ranking were trained in Soviet military and political schools and it is said that even those who achieved their ranks and positions through Tito, had hoped at the time of the Cominform Resolution that the dispute was of a minor nature, soon to be ironed out, and that Yugoslavia would remain with the Soviet Union.
- 4) It is extremely difficult to establish the extent to which the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party has actually been successful in the re-indoctrination of the commanding officers' cadre, and the amount of success the AOS has had in the elimination of leading Cominformists from Army ranks through purges and arrests. one fourth of the peacetime officers' cadre would be fully devoted to Tito and the current Yugoslav Party line, one fourth would be pro-Cominform, while one half would continue to be undecided and impartial, ready to support the one who proves to be ultimately successful.
- 5) The Yugoslav Communist Party is aware that the very teachings embedded in the minds of the officers on the greatness and invincibility of the Soviet Union and the theory of a world revolution could easily reap negative results for the Yugoslav Communist Party, and as a result surveillance has been intensified and drastic discipline and measures of control of speech and thought instituted. A case is cited where, during a speech to the officers of the Guard Division, Tito was compelled to intervene personally and demand that free discussion of technical and political problems be permitted. The Yugoslav Communist Party respects the importance of the Army as the backbone of the regime, and in particular, the importance of the commanding officers' cadre. In line with this, it endeavors to raise its education level and standard of living above those of the ordinary citizen. Through various material privileges accorded to it, the Party attempts to gain and achieve among the officers the required state of morale.

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- 6) A large number of high and low ranking commanding officers are report-

ed to be filled with fear of war as a result of the awareness of the actual weakness in armament and equipment and an inferiority complex derived from the lack of general and specialized training. Another point brought out is that the commanding officers' cadre, which is chiefly composed of Communists, now finds itself in a position where it will eventually be obliged to fight alongside the capitalists (sic) and that this would not necessarily be a boost to their morale.

State of Morale among the Soldiers

- 7) The state of morale among the enlisted men reportedly varies according to the different units.⁴ Certain special units demand that the young men enlisted must either be NOJ members or from a family of good Communist standing. Such units are the Guard Division, the KNOJ, and various communications units. As a result the morale in these units is considerably better, and added to this are more favorable treatment, and better food and clothing. Other units made up of peasants, in general dissatisfied with conditions, and of workers also dissatisfied, either because they have been disillusioned or have alleged Cominform leanings, cannot truthfully boast of a high state of morale. Only a small part within such units comprises young men who support Tito. The state of morale in military schools is reported to be excellent. Everything in these schools is done to make the young men, all of whom are Communists, comfortable. It is alleged that the state of morale among the enlisted men in general is concealed through strict discipline and the fact that a sufficient number of Communists have been infiltrated among each unit for purposes of surveillance. The possibility does exist, however, that Yugoslav units, if they were to fight a war in their peacetime formation and under peacetime commanders, would fight, and would not be likely to disintegrate easily. In this connection, however, it would be important whether the morale of the officers was high or not.

b. State of Morale in a Mobilized Army in a State of War.

- 8) The Yugoslav peacetime Army which has two or three age groups under arms in its peacetime formation has a strength of approximately 300,000 men.⁵ The wartime formation would require a strength of 1,200,000 men for the active Army, and 400,000 men in the reserves. The total would consequently be 1,600,000 men. As a result, approximately 1,300,000 would have to be called from the reserves. The current strength of the peacetime Army would thus appear to form only the nucleus of the cadre which would be required in the organization of the Army in a state of war.
- 9) In order to appraise the state of morale, the first question to arise is as to how many of these 1,600,000 men are actually Communists. First taking official figures which place the ratio between male and female members (including candidates for Communist Party membership as well as the NOJ) as 70 opposed to 30, which means that of the total number of Communists which is listed as 851,727, the male portion would equal 596,209. Since the Yugoslav male population is listed as 7,579,538, the percentage of Communists among the male population would be approximately 12.7 percent. If this percentage is applied to a fully mobilized Army in a state of war, it would seem that from 1,600,000 soldiers only 203,200 would be Communists. The remainder of approximately 1,400,000 would represent those who are politically impartial or opposed to Communism.

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- 10) It was suggested above in the survey of the state of morale in the Yugoslav peacetime Army that the commanding officers' cadre, 95 percent of which is supposedly Communist, is the backbone of the Army morale. The commanding officers' cadre in like manner would also represent the backbone of the morale in a fully mobilized Army in a state of war. If the ratio in the peacetime Army is 20 enlisted men to one officer and two non-commissioned officers, the ratio in a fully mobilized Army would be 40 enlisted men to one officer and two non-commissioned officers. In view of these figures, the peacetime Army would have 300,000 enlisted men as opposed to 15,000 officers and 30,000 non-commissioned officers who are Communists, and a fully mobilized Army in a state of war would have 1,600,000 enlisted men as opposed to 40,000 officers and 80,000 non-commissioned officers. The difference of 25,000 officers and 50,000 non-commissioned officers would have to be called from the reserves. 50X1-HUM

the present Yugoslav regime was obliged because of the scarcity of officers to call into reserve practically all the former pre-war active and reserve officers regardless of their political leanings.

- 11) According to the above figures, the Communist backbone in the Army which comprises the commanding officers' cadre would be overwhelmed by the large number of officers in a fully mobilized Army who are not Communist. The Communist portion on the other hand would have within it a Cominform element which also requires consideration. the state of morale in a fully mobilized Yugoslav Army, led by a handful of discordant Communists, would be of a very low level. 50X1-HUM

Belief in the Possibility of a Cominform Attack

10. The Yugoslav population in general, and the low ranking commanding officers in particular, under the influence of various factors such as the stepped up construction of fortifications, maintenance of food, equipment, munitions and fuel reserves, increase in para-military training and call up to maneuvers for the reserves, appear to believe that war is imminent. The high ranking commanding personnel on the other hand do not believe that the Cominform satellites are sufficiently strong for offensive action at the present time. They believe that the Cominform prefers rather to create a fifth column in Yugoslavia, so that at a moment of crisis, after sufficient preparation for war, a civil war can be created between the two Communist factions in Yugoslavia, and voluntary troops dropped or smuggled into the country to assist their faction.

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Will to Resist

12. All Cominformists can be expected to desert the Army and join the opposing forces. It can also be expected that they will attempt to draw on their side the remainder of the population. [redacted] the soldiers whom Cominformists can not successfully win over will eventually desert the Army to return to their homes. In the event of attack, [redacted] not believe that Tito's Army could possibly hold out for long, perhaps not even to extent that the partially mobilized Army held out in 1941. 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM

2. [redacted] Comment: It should be borne in mind that the active officers' cadre comprises a total of 95.9% of new officers, and only 4.1% of officers of the pre-war Army. 50X1-HUM

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5. [redacted] Comment: This figure is considered to be low. The Yugoslav Army strength is generally considered to be approximately 500,000 men. [redacted]

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